

**UNDERMINING SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP:
THE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE EFFECTS OF BEHAVIOURAL
CONTROLS IN SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION**

by Dr. Hartley Dean

Reader in Social Policy, Department of Social Studies,
University of Luton, Park Square, Luton, LU1 3JU, UK.
(Tel: +44 1582 734111; Fax: +44 1582 489358;
E-mail: <hartley.dean@luton.ac.uk>)

A paper to be presented to the ISSA Second International Research
Conference on Social Security, Jerusalem, 25-28 January 1998

Undermining Social Citizenship: The counterproductive effects of behavioural controls in social security administration

Hartley Dean

Abstract:

Drawing upon aspects of research undertaken by the author, this paper argues that manipulating conditions of entitlement to social security benefits, at best, is unlikely to influence the behaviour of the recipients and, at worst, may counterproductively undermine people's commitment to the principles of social democratic citizenship. Particular attention is paid to attempts by British governments to use social security policy to create incentives for labour market participation, family unity and the avoidance of state dependency. In the context of the casualisation of labour markets and changing household patterns it can be demonstrated that such attempts rub against the grain of popular aspirations and, in certain circumstances, undermine people's sense of obligation as citizens. The consequences for some may be a greater willingness to participate in fraudulent behaviour and/or illegal forms of economic activity; for others it may be a greater reluctance to acknowledge the nature of reciprocal rights and obligations. The paper concludes with a discussion of the role which social security policy may play in sustaining popular conceptions of citizenship.

'... the act of making up income without strings would come into open conflict with the other values upon which all societies are built - for example, that incomes are earned by work, that men living as husbands with women should support them, that children living with parents should be supported by them, and so on. For the sake of preserving its order and cohesion, society insists that these values are upheld. The function of [social security] schemes is as much to control behaviour as to meet need.' (Townsend 1979: 823)

Peter Townsend's classic explanation of the disciplinary potential of social security administration, though specifically applied to means-tested (social assistance) benefits, is also substantially applicable to contribution-tested (social insurance) benefits. It accurately reflects the extent to which social guarantees of income maintenance are based on particular normative assumptions about individuals' liabilities to maintain themselves through paid employment, to maintain each other within (characteristically patriarchal) families, and to submit to the rule of law. It has been variously argued that the development of the welfare state has been necessary to the maintenance of the capitalist wage labour system (e.g. Offe 1984), and that modernity itself is characterised by the rise of state administrative processes which individuate and discipline the subject (Foucault 1977).

The emergence of modern social security systems had been associated with a transition from coercive to more discreet and sophisticated forms of discipline; the social rights of citizenship afforded by welfare capitalism were not wholly emancipatory but have remained subtly inseparable - in sometimes quite subtle ways - from the enforcement of socially constructed duties (Dean 1991; 1996). However, taking the case of the social security system in the UK, this paper will examine recent changes which suggest a reversion in social security administration towards more explicitly coercive behavioural controls. My purpose is not so much to theorise those changes as to comment upon their impact. It is important none the less to emphasise that such

changes do not necessarily represent mere regression to the older and more inflexible forms of social control associated, for example, with the Poor Law, but that they may portend a transition to an entirely new kind of welfare regime. Some commentators now argue that the dull repression of 'modernity' is being supplanted by the seductive but brutal consumerism of 'post-modernity' (e.g. Bauman 1988); that the certainties of capitalism's class based order are being superseded by a society based on more hazardous principles (e.g. Beck 1992); and that the monolithic forms of administration and provision associated with the 'Fordist' welfare state are being replaced in the age of 'Post-Fordism' by more diverse kinds of management, regulation and control (Burrows and Loader 1994). The evidence presented in this paper raises questions about the extent to which associated transitions in social security administration are either effective or sustainable.

I shall initially outline the relevant changes which have occurred in the UK since the 1980s, before drawing on three pieces of recent research which suggest that manipulating conditions of entitlement to social security benefits is, at best, unlikely to influence the behaviour of recipients and, at worst, may counterproductively undermine people's commitment to the principles of social democratic citizenship. The first of these projects investigated the alleged 'dependency culture' which changes in the benefits regime were intended to stamp out. The second investigated the fraudulent behaviour and illegal economic activity to which the retrenchment of benefits regimes may lead. The third investigated the underlying beliefs and discourses upon which popular perceptions of rights to welfare and the obligations of citizenship are based.

The transition to a more repressive system

The UK social security system has always been a 'hybrid' system. Using the categories seminally defined by Esping-Andersen (1990), it has combined features of a social-democratic regime (because some benefits are universal), a conservative/corporatist regime (because some benefits are contributory) and a liberal/residualist regime (because some benefits are means-tested). There can be little doubt that, since the 1980s, the UK regime has become less hybrid as it has increasingly emphasised the features of a liberal/residualist regime: a transition which might broadly be characterised as the 'Americanisation' of social security policy (see, for example, Leibried 1993), or as a transition from a Keynesian Welfare State to a Schumpeterian Workfare State (Jessop 1994) in which an increasingly heterogeneous and unequal populace is controlled by an increasingly technocratic and remote elite.

Though the changes have been incremental, they have fallen into three broad phases: Thatcherite retrenchment; the new moral agenda; New Labour workfarism.

Thatcherite retrenchment (1979-90)

For all the radicalism of the Thatcher governments, the impact which they had upon the welfare state in general and the social security system in particular was in some ways surprisingly modest (e.g. LeGrand 1990). None the less, the changes brought about in this period have had significant and lasting effects. Although the Thatcher governments did not succeed in curtailing the growth of expenditure on social security, in their attempts to do so they succeeded in cutting the real levels of benefits,

most importantly by changing the basis on which most benefits and pensions are annually updated so as to link this to price inflation rather than earnings growth: this was a move that ensured a more punitive gap between those on benefits and those in employment. The Fowler Reviews (DHSS 1985) led to a major overhaul in which the emphasis of the social security system was switched firmly towards 'targeted' provision for the most needy: this involved a widening of the scope for means-testing and its associated surveillance mechanisms and, for the poorest citizens, a return to a discretionary system of relief in the shape of the social fund (Andrews and Jacobs 1990). There were also concerted attempts to privatise aspects of social security through the introduction of employer mandated benefits for sickness and maternity (which handed new disciplinary powers to employers) and through the promotion of private and occupational pension provision (which, amongst other effects, penalises people with poor employment records). Finally, there was a barrage of changes to the rules associated with benefits for unemployed people, most of which were intended to increase work incentives (Atkinson and Micklewright 1988).

The new moral agenda (1990-97)

John Major's premiership witnessed, on the one hand a significant attempt to redefine the basis of welfare state citizenship, and on the other the fruition of radical Right-wing initiatives actually begun in the preceding era. John Major's 'Citizen's Charter' (Prime Minister's Office 1991) signalled the displacement of the Fordist public service ethic with a new managerialist doctrine (see, for example, Gray and Jenkins 1993) that sought to reconstitute the citizen as a consumer of services and state administration as a business accountable for the quality of services, not through the democratic process, but through the discipline of market-like processes. The consequence was an uncoupling of social security administration from political processes - reflected in the creation of a semi-autonomous executive Benefits Agency - and a new vulnerability for social security claimants who became in a practical and symbolic sense individually responsible as competent consumers for getting the best out of the system: the basis of their rights and obligations as citizens had been diluted or, at least, abridged.

In the same period, the government introduced the Child Support Act (CSA) and Jobseeker's allowance (JSA). Each in its way introduced starker and more simplistic notions of rights and obligation. Supported both by neo-conservatives and the moral Right (e.g. Murray 1994) on the one hand, and by ethical socialists (e.g. Dennis and Erdos 1993) on the other, the purpose of the CSA was to enforce upon biological parents an inviolable duty to support their children financially. In the process, it was hoped, lone-parenthood would be discouraged and the 'traditional' family upheld, and the cost of maintaining lone-parents (mainly mothers) would be transferred from the state to private individuals ('absent' fathers) (see Garnham and Knights 1994). JSA was introduced to replace existing benefits arrangements for unemployed people and, by its very name, the new scheme announced that social protection for unemployed people would henceforth be available only to those who were seeking employment. Not only did the new scheme reduce the rights which had previously been enjoyed by unemployed people, but it introduced new mechanisms by which to control the behaviour of unemployed people and to discipline those who are not sufficiently compliant (Finn 1997).

New Labour workfarism (1997-)

Though the election of the Labour government under Tony Blair's premiership is still very recent, it is possible tentatively to observe the direction in which social security policy in the UK may develop. The 'New' Labour Party which, after 18 years in opposition, has finally wrested power from the Conservatives is conspicuously different from the 'Old' Labour Party that had presided over the creation of the modern welfare state in the post-Second World War period and which had developed it during later terms of office in the 1960s and '70s. In the Labour manifesto (Labour Party 1997) to which the electorate gave its endorsement Blair pledges a 'bond of trust' with 'the broad majority of people who work hard, play by the rules [and] pay their dues'. The manifesto proposes to implement welfare reform 'based on rights and duties going together', including a 'welfare-to-work programme' for unemployed people, and a 'proactive' Employment Service for lone-parents. Blair had previously argued that 'the most meaningful stake anyone can have in society is the ability to earn a living and support a family' (1996). The kind of 'stakeholder capitalism' envisaged by Blair is ambiguously conceived. It is a concept which vacates the ground conventionally occupied by social democrats by calling both upon elements of an essentially conservative communitarianism and upon more individualistic moral repertoires (e.g. Driver and Martell 1997).

The tendency already evident in Conservative policies of tying training and employment initiatives increasingly closely to social security and unemployment relief had been taken as evidence of a shift towards 'workfare' on the coercive United States model. Though it rejects the term 'workfare' in favour of the expression 'welfare to work', New Labour's policy is informed by the recommendations of the Commission on Social Justice (Borrie 1994: 172-182) and the example of the Australian Jobs, Education and Training (JET) scheme. It is as much a labour market strategy as a social security policy (e.g. Deacon 1997). It envisages, not a job guarantee or direct investment in employment creation, but 'active' re-employment services, training to improve 'employability', encouragement of self-employment; after-school childcare initiatives, and selective short-term employer subsidies.

The objectives of workfare may have been positively reframed in New Labour rhetoric but, in essence, the space between citizen and state is being 'hollowed out' (Jessop 1994: 24) as the balance shifts in favour of global market imperatives. The old social democratic welfare state required a trade-off between collective expectations and the correlative obligations which constrain the individual citizen - to pay such taxes and contributions as may be due, and/or to observe certain rules attaching to the receipt of state services or benefits. Now, however, expectations are subordinated to economic forces and what remains of the social trade-off can indeed be defined - in Tony Blair's terms - as an individualised 'stake'. It is a stake which centre-Left governments may claim to underwrite, but which also constitutes a wider set of strictly individual obligations that are ultimately enforceable by the government through the conditions which attach to the receipt of state services and benefits.

Eliminating dependency?

The social security policies introduced during the period of 'Thatcherite retrenchment' were intended or justified by their proponents as an attack upon the so called 'dependency culture' (McGlone 1990); as a means to move people 'away from dependence towards independence' (Moore 1987). They were therefore designed to reinforce work incentives, encourage dependency on liable relatives and/or the wider family, and increase the scrutiny to which welfare claims and claimants were subject. In 1990 the author was involved in a qualitative study that entailed in-depth interviews with 85 working age welfare benefit recipients. The objective was to determine the extent to which a distinctive dependency culture could be said to exist among such recipients and to which policies to limit state dependency were or might be effective (see Dean and Taylor-Gooby 1992). It was found that, though some respondents plainly felt they were 'trapped' on benefits (cf. Jordan et al 1992), this did not mean that they were part of an identifiable sub-culture, or that they did not subscribe to the norms and values of mainstream culture. What is more, many of the changes to the benefits system were rubbing 'against the grain' of popular expectations and aspirations and were potentially corrosive of labour discipline, family values and responsible attitudes to the state.

Labour discipline

One unemployed respondent in the study spoke for the majority when he said 'I don't need encouraging [to find work]'. Fully three quarters of the sample were plainly anxious to work, including many of the lone-parents who were not immediately in a position to seek work (cf. McLaughlin et al 1989; Gallie and Vogler 1990). Motivation to work or to take up education or training opportunities was plainly not an issue for most and, even the minority that did not wish to work either intended to do so at some stage or, in various ways, felt guilty about not working. For most respondents it was difficult to see what beneficial effect additional incentives could have. What came across most clearly was that paid employment was valued primarily as a means to self-esteem or identity and only secondarily as a means to material reward. Where material rewards were valued, there was virtue or 'worth' associated with the effort involved or the pride taken in one's work. Though some respondents declared themselves willing to take even 'shit jobs', others spoke of the demoralisation and the loss of self-motivation which accepting such an option would entail. To this extent, measures intended to price benefit recipients into low paid or uncongenial jobs could undermine the value which people place on having worthwhile employment. Manipulating the benefits system to increase work incentives may adversely affect labour discipline and commitment.

Family values

Several respondents in the study expressly voiced a sense in which they felt it was 'wrong' to depend for income on, for example, one's parents or adult offspring. They took 'pride' in managing independently of their families. Two-thirds of the sample expressed disapproval of the idea that they should be required to turn for help to family or friends. What came across was the sense in which the family (in its individual nuclear manifestation) is valued primarily for its affective relationships and emotional rewards and only secondarily as a means to reciprocal material security. To the extent that material security is valued, its importance is restricted to obligations which are

seen to arise during very specific socially constructed stages of the life-cycle - especially, childhood. Respondents were resentful that the state should interfere in the privacy of family relationships, or that it might seek to disturb or undermine the established patterns of dependency within their own immediate families. In spite of the rapid social and economic changes which have borne on the family as an institution (Utting 1995), considerable value is still placed on 'satisfying' family relationships. In many ways, the relative independence or dependability which benefits and pensions have given people have played a part in strengthening the affective basis of family ties, and history suggests that manipulating welfare arrangements to reverse or adapt patterns of family obligation is likely to fail (Finch 1989; Dean 1995). Alternatively, it may devalue the very family relationships which are by popular consensus important.

Attitudes to the state

One respondent in the study spoke for many when she said of benefit administrators - 'these people make you feel they're trying to do you out of something'. Virtually all the benefit recipients interviewed for this study had experienced difficulties with their claims for benefits and two-thirds said that they found the system as a whole to be unfair. The mistrust and resentment fostered by their experiences of the social security system were hardly conducive to a sense of citizenship. The impression received was that the increasingly stringent, coercive and punitive nature of the system was strengthening claimants' inclination to view the state as adversary; that it may even undermine their willingness to co-operate with the state or to accept the obligations of citizenship. This was most clearly to be seen when respondents were asked whether (if they knew they could get away with it) they would be willing to 'fiddle' their benefit claims in order to get extra money. More than half replied that they would and this willingness in principle to defraud the social security system appeared to be directly related to resentment about their experiences of the system and/or to their perceptions that the system was unfair. Implied here was the possibility that eroding the substance of people's rights to welfare may undermine their sense of formal obligation as citizens of a welfare state.

Encouraging illegality?

The abovementioned findings were one of the factors which informed a small-scale qualitative study of social security benefit fraud which was undertaken by the author in 1994-5. Social security benefit fraud in the UK had been a cause of moral panic in the 1980s (Golding and Middleton 1982; Cook 1989) and increasingly draconian counter-measures by government throughout the 1990s (Deacon and Fairfoot 1994; Sainsbury 1996). The study in question entailed in-depth interviews with 35 individuals who were fraudulently claiming social security benefits (Dean and Melrose 1996 and 1997). Most of the fraud committed by this sample related to undisclosed earnings from informal employment. The study focused first on the motivations of these claimants, and secondly on their attitudes to the rights and obligations of citizenship.

Economic insecurity

Associated with the global economic forces which constrain national governments has been a drive in certain western countries to de-regulate labour markets and to

maximise the flexibility of labour supply. The effect at the periphery of the labour market is sustained levels of unemployment, underemployment and 'hypercasualisation' (Jordan and Redley 1994): the proliferation of, not only casual/temporary employment and intermittent self-employment, but also informal and illegal forms of employment, much of which is covertly subsidised through social security fraud. This process has coincided, as we have seen, with shifts away from universal state welfare towards more selective forms of social security provision and the emergence of a more parsimonious yet increasingly complex benefits system. The effect of low benefit levels and the perverse incentives associated with means-tested schemes is further to exacerbate participation in the informal economy (Evason and Woods 1995).

The predominant reason given by respondents in the study for defrauding the benefit system was that of economic necessity, of not obtaining sufficient income from benefits. For most respondents, the vicissitudes of life on a very low income represented a bigger worry than the prospect of getting caught for benefit fraud, the risk of which is in any event perceived to be relatively low (cf. Rowlingson et al 1997). None the less, many of these claimants did live with considerable anxiety. The only thing which would have dissuaded virtually all of them from continuing to defraud the benefit system was a 'proper' job at an acceptable wage. Hardly any of the respondents were at all 'streetwise' about the benefit system: they were neither knowledgeable about their entitlements nor keen to maximise or prolong their claims on the state. The overwhelming impression was that most people who claim benefits and work illegally are not exercising a conscious life-style choice, so much as muddling through and waiting, like late twentieth century versions of Mr. Micawber, for something better to turn up. Few of them felt that what they were doing was fundamentally dishonest, but most experienced the process as uncomfortable and hazardous; as part and parcel of struggling to make ends meet.

A sense of betrayal

In practice, most respondents had somewhat vague or depleted concepts of citizenship and its obligations. None the less, their understanding of citizenship could be explored through the way they talked about 'rights' and 'fairness'. Most believed they had a right to claim social security benefits, but this was not a right they valued highly because of the discomfort or stigma associated with exercising it. Most respondents (25 of the 35) were observed to have engaged with discourses by which they would justify their own disobedience as citizens. At their simplest, such discourses translated economic necessity into justification and sought to blame inadequate benefit levels and the perversities of the benefit system. However, some respondents, because of the difficulties entailed in establishing their claims to benefit, were reacting to the way they had been 'messed about' or given 'a hard time' by the system. Such discourses often touched directly on issues of equity or justice. Feeling they had not received that to which they were entitled, respondents might justify their actions with reference to the taxes and contributions which they or their forbears had paid in the past. Implicit here was the idea that the welfare state has betrayed them: that the new regime was unfair.

This is not to say that respondents were by and large supportive of the welfare state. On the contrary, a few were openly hostile to it. However, there was a sense in which, for some respondents, the very nature of citizenship had been impoverished.

Sometimes, with evident scepticism or resentment, they equated citizenship status with consumption, lifestyle or wealth. It was not only that these respondents felt excluded from citizenship, but they sensed that they were experiencing a retreat from the values associated with the social democratic welfare state.

In suggesting that fraudulent benefit claimants may be reacting to the changed nature of the welfare state it is important to emphasise that fraudulent claimants as a group are extremely diverse. The study demonstrated that those involved differed from one another in terms of the degree of reflexivity which they brought to fraudulent claiming and in the degree of anxiety which they experienced. Though reflexivity and chronic anxiety may be endemic (Giddens 1991), it cannot be assumed that they affect all subjects uniformly. Of the claimants who were not especially reflexive, the few who were not anxious tended to be the least principled of all the respondents, while those who were anxious were characteristically fatalistic about their situation: the former group was unlikely to be deterred from benefit fraud, but the latter would probably be less inclined to defraud the system if the system itself was more transparent and predictable. Of the claimants who were relatively reflexive, the few who were not anxious tended to be the most subversive of all the respondents, while those who were anxious were acting largely out of desperation: the former group would probably not commit fraud if it was persuaded that the system was just, while the latter - the largest in the sample - would almost certainly not commit fraud if the system afforded them greater security. In the event, none of the counter-fraud initiatives adopted by the government seem likely to have a very significant effect.

Reducing mutual obligation?

The abovementioned findings have in turn informed a rather different kind of study which has sought more generally to explore popular perceptions and discourses in relation to poverty, wealth and citizenship. This latest study entailed in-depth interviews with 76 working adults with very widely differing levels of income (Dean with Melrose, forthcoming). The objectives of the study were concerned, not with matters of social security administration, but with the wider context in which people's expectations of the welfare state are generated and sustained. The study demonstrates, first the extent to which people draw on a contradictory range of moral discourses in relation to the rights and obligations of citizenship and secondly, that this helps to account, not only for the ambiguity of public opinion towards the welfare state, but also for the deep and complex background against which any system of behavioural controls and incentives is pitted.

Contradictory moral discourses

By and large, the findings suggest, people at every income level are predisposed to free-market individualism and harbour a certain fascination for wealth, but they retain a pragmatic and self-interested commitment to elements of state collectivism and a deep fear of poverty: a fear which extends right up the income scale. However much people may come to mistrust the state, the abhorrence of poverty exceeds the desire for wealth. By implication, the preference is for a form of citizenship that protects against the risk of poverty before it secures the opportunity to achieve personal wealth.

Respondents in the study frequently appeared indifferent or even incoherent with regard to issues of citizenship. In response to explicit questions some adopted narrow, nationalistic notions of citizenship, though others engaged with broader conceptions. None the less, virtually all the respondents could be seen to be drawing on a diversity of often contradictory moral discourses or discursive 'repertoires'. It is not only that people differ, as we have seen, in the degree of reflexivity or 'cleverness' which they exhibit and in the amount of anxiety which they suffer: they also differ -

- in the moral and ideological substance of the explanations they use (which can rest on solidaristic, universalistic or collectivist values on the one hand, or contractarian, autonomistic or individualist values on the other);
- in the 'voice' or forms of expression upon which they can call (which might rest on reflexive or radical conventions on the one hand, or on received myths or established traditions on the other).

It is possible to make sense of the depleted or ambiguous conceptions of citizenship which people exhibit when it is seen that popular discourse contains a complex mixture of explanations, reflecting sometimes inconsistent traditions and expectations.

Support for state welfare

This goes some way towards explaining the ambiguous mixture of guarded altruism and pragmatic instrumentalism which characterises public opinion towards the welfare state in the UK (cf. Rentoul 1989; Brook et al 1996). Expectations of the welfare state on the part of respondents in the study were found to be high, even when this was tempered by suspicion of it. As might be anticipated, respondents on very low incomes were more strongly in favour of redistributive state intervention than were respondents on very high incomes but, paradoxically, the poorest respondents were less inclined to indulge in solidaristic rhetoric than the richest ones: the former, perhaps have less occasion in the current climate to believe that the state is going to help them; the latter have more occasion to fear the potentially disruptive consequences of growing social inequality.

The analysis suggested a fundamental tension within popular discourse between:

- concerns for social justice and a reformist impulse which stem largely from a pragmatic desire for the predictability and security that flow from greater equality;
- commitment to social cohesion and an essentially conformist impulse which are fuelled by an implicit conservatism and desire for certainty and stability;
- belief in meritocratic principles and an entrepreneurial impulse which would seize the potential for personal self advancement;
- a sense of fatalism and a survivalist impulse based on a presumption that inequality is to be contended with as an inevitable hazard.

When account was taken of the full range of underlying moral discourses employed by the respondents in the study, it did appear that contractarian, autonomistic or individualist modes of expression dominated over solidaristic, universalistic or collectivist modes - but they by no means eclipsed them. There is robustly surviving

within popular discourse a paradigm which accepts a role for a social-democratic welfare state and a range of values which would support it. What is more, that paradigm and those values are not the evanescent vestiges of some bygone age, but reflections of contemporary fears and aspirations. Changing 'hearts and minds' requires more than changes in the nature of the prevailing welfare regime.

Conclusion

Bringing together related threads from the different studies outlined above, it may be argued - first, that attempting to use the administrative rules of social security systems as a means to change or influence human behaviour is likely to be largely ineffectual; second, that attempting to use social security policy to curtail state dependency may lead on the one hand to an increase in fraud and illegal economic activity, and on the other to an erosion of people's sense of citizenship; third, that attempting to shift the underlying basis of a welfare regime cannot be undertaken without a clearer understanding of the complex ways in which the moral and practical significance of citizenship is socially constructed and popularly understood.

The effectiveness of incentives and penalties in the administration of social security provision will depend on the extent to which these accommodate the complex and sometimes irrational basis of popular beliefs and aspirations. It cannot be assumed that we are any of us model citizens. But neither is it helpful to base social security systems on the Hobbesian assumption that all subjects are venal, calculating and self-interested. It is both possible and, I would argue, necessary that social security rules should recognise and work with the grain of social expectations.

If it is accepted that people do by and large value paid employment, then the interface between income maintenance and labour market policies needs to reflect a quite different set of assumptions. If it is accepted that family relationships are in themselves important, then social security and child support arrangements should not impair such relationships by enforcing involuntary dependency; or, where such relationships are dependent relationships, the dependability of parents or carers should be adequately underwritten. If it is accepted - regardless of wider ideological considerations - that citizenship is necessarily based on at least some measure of mutual security, then social security systems should enable claimants and not manage them; they should lessen and not exacerbate risk; and they should prevent and not create social exclusion. In the process of meeting need, such systems will indeed affect behaviour, not least because they may serve to clarify, shape or sustain popular conceptions of citizenship.

Acknowledgement:

The author is grateful to the UK Economic and Social Research Council, which funded the three research projects discussed in this paper: 'Dependency Culture: The image and reality of the claiming experience', (with P.Taylor-Gooby, Award Ref: R000231776); 'Welfare Citizenship and Economic Rationality', (Award Ref: L122251010); 'Poverty, Wealth and Citizenship', (with M.Melrose, Award Ref: R000236264).

References:

- Andrews, K. and Jacobs, J. (1990) *Punishing the Poor: Poverty under Thatcher*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Atkinson, A. and Micklewright, J. (1988) *Turning the Screw: Benefits for the Unemployed 1979-1988*, STICERD, London School of Economics, London.
- Bauman, Z. (1988) *Freedom*, Open University Press, Buckingham.
- Beck, U. (1992) *Risk Society: Towards a new modernity*, Sage, London.
- Blair, T. (1996) 'Battle for Britain', *The Guardian*, 29 January.
- Borrie, Sir Gordon (1994) *Social Justice: Strategies for national renewal, The report of the Commission on Social Justice*, IPPR/Vintage, London.
- Brook, L., Hall, J. and Preston, I. (1996) 'Public spending and taxation', in R.Jowell, J.Curtice, A.Park, L.Brook and K.Thompson (eds) (1996) *British Social Attitudes, The 13th report*, Dartmouth, Aldershot.
- Burrows, R. and Loader, B. (eds) (1994) *Towards a Post-Fordist Welfare State?*, Routledge, London.
- Cook, D. (1989) *Rich Law, Poor Law: Different responses to tax and supplementary benefit fraud*, Open University Press, Milton Keynes.
- Deacon, A. (1997) "'Welfare to Work": Options and issues', in M.May, E.Brunsdon and G.Craig (eds) *Social Policy Review 9*, Social Policy Association, London.
- Deacon, A. and Fairfoot, P. (1994) 'Investigating fraud ', *Poverty*, No. 87.
- Dean, H. (1991) *Social Security and Social Control*, Routledge, London.
- Dean, H. (ed.) (1995) *Parents' Duties, Children's Debts: The limits of policy intervention*, Ashgate, Aldershot.
- Dean, H. (1996) *Welfare, Law and Citizenship*, Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Dean, H. and Melrose, M. (1996) 'Unravelling citizenship: The significance of social security benefit fraud', *Critical Social Policy*, Issue 48.
- Dean, H. and Melrose, M. (1997) 'Manageable Discord: Fraud and resistance in the social security system', *Social Policy and Administration*, Vol. 31, No. 2.
- Dean, H. with Melrose, M. (forthcoming) *Poverty, Riches and Social Citizenship*, Macmillan, Basingstoke.
- Dean, H. and Taylor-Gooby, P. (1992) *Dependency Culture: The explosion of a myth*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead.
- Dennis, N. and Erdos, G. (1993) *Families Without Fatherhood*, IEA, London.
- Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) (1985) *The Reform of Social Security*, Cmnd. 9517, HMSO, London.
- Driver, S. and Martell, L. (1997) 'New Labour's communitarianisms', *Critical Social Policy*, Issue 52.
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Polity, Cambridge.
- Evason, E. and Woods, R. (1995) 'Poverty, de-regulation of the labour market and benefit fraud', *Social Policy and Administration*, Vol. 29, No. 1.
- Finch, J. (1989) *Family Obligations and Social Change*, Polity Press, Cambridge.
- Finn, D. (1997) 'The Stricter Benefit Regime and the New Deal for the Unemployed', paper given at the annual conference of the Social Policy Association, *New Politics: New Welfare ?* University of Lincolnshire and Humberside, Lincoln, 15-17 July
- Foucault, M. (1977) *Discipline and Punish: The birth of the prison*, Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Gallie, D. and Vogler, C. (1990) *Unemployment and Attitudes to Work*, Working Paper No. 18, Social Change and Economic Life Initiative, Nuffield College, Oxford.
- Garnham, A. and Knights, E. (1994) *Putting the Treasury First: The truth about child support*, CPAG, London.
- Giddens, A. (1991) *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and society in the late modern age*, Polity Press, Cambridge.
- Golding, P. and Middleton, S. (1982) *Images of Welfare: Press and public attitudes to poverty*, Martin Robertson, Oxford.
- Jessop, B. (1994) 'The transition to post-Fordism and the Schumpeterian workfare state' in Burrows, R. and Loader, B. (eds.) *Towards a Post-Fordist Welfare State?*, Routledge, London.
- Jordan, B., James, S., Kay, H. and Redley, P. (1992) *Trapped in Poverty? Labour market decisions in low income households*, Routledge, London.
- Jordan, B. and Redley, P. (1994) 'Polarisation, underclass and the welfare state', *Work, Employment and Society*, Vol. 8, No. 2
- Labour Party (1997) *New Labour: Because Britain deserves better*, General Election Manifesto, London.

- LeGrand, J. (1990) 'The state of welfare', in J.Hills (ed.) *The State of Welfare: The welfare state in Britain since 1974*, Clarendon, Oxford.
- Leibried, S. (1993) 'Towards a European welfare state?', in C.Jones (ed.) *New Perspectives on the Welfare State in Europe*, Routledge, London.
- McLaughlin, E., Millar, J. and Cooke, K. (1989) *Work and Welfare Benefits*, Avebury, Aldershot.
- Murray, C. (1994) *Underclass: The crisis deepens*, IEA, London.
- Moore, J. (1987) 'Welfare and dependency', speech to Conservative Constituency Parties' Association, September.
- McGlone, F. (1987) 'Away from the dependency culture', in S.Savage and L.Robins (eds) *Public Policy Under Thatcher*, Macmillan, Basingstoke.
- Offe, C. (1984) *Contradictions of the Welfare State*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
- Rentoul, J. (1989) *Me and Mine: The triumph of the new individualism?*, Unwin Hyman, London.
- Rowlingson, K., Whyley, C., Newburn, T. and Berthoud, R. (1997) *Social Security Fraud: The role of penalties*, The Stationery Office, London.
- Sainsbury, R. (1996) 'Rooting out fraud - innocent until proven fraudulent', *Poverty*, No. 93.
- Townsend, P. (1979) *Poverty in the United Kingdom*, Penguin, Harmondsworth.